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INTRODUCTION
Appellant takes this opportunity to respond to the arguments
set forth in the respective briefs of the two Respondents.

The

remaining arguments of the Appellant are adequately covered in
Appellant's original Appellate Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

Casa Herrerra„ Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The intent of the Utah Legislature in adopting the amended

version of U.C.A. §78-15-3 was to provide a claimant with a
reasonable opportunity to discover the facts necessary for the
accrual of a products liability cause of action, prior to the
running of the statute of limitations period.
Accepted

rules of statutory construction require that a

statute be construed in conformance with relevantf existing tort
law, and that a statute be given a reasonable and

sensible

construction, which will best promote the protection of the public.
Aragon's interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 is consistent with the
intent of the legislature, as well as with common principles of
statutory construction.
U.C.A. §78-15-3 is the statute of limitations provision that
should govern the above entitled lawsuit.

The legislature has

incorporated the "discovery rule" into U.C.A. §78-15-3, mandating
a common law requirement that the statute of limitations period be
tolled until the Plaintiff discovers the identity of the manufacturer of the product causing the injury. There is a genuine issue
1

of material fact as to whether Plaintiff/Appellant James M. Aragon
should have discovered the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc. more
than two years prior to October 16, 1990.
Finally, because the trial court set aside James M. Aragon's
default judgment against Casa Herrerra, Inc., presumably, so that
the lawsuit could proceed on its merits, it is now inequitable to
allow Casa Herrerra, Inc. to obtain the equivalent of a default
judgment

against Aragon—by

granting

its motion

for

summary

judgment based on non-compliance with the the applicable statute of
limitations provision—unless

it is absolutely, unquestionably

mandated.
B.

Clover Club Foods Companv/Borden, Inc/s Motion for Summary
Judgment•
The issue of whether Borden, Inc. paid any of James M.

Aragon's worker's compensation award was not litigated in the
worker's

compensation

Commission.

proceedings

before the Utah

Industrial

Therefore, the litigation of such issue in this

lawsuit is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
A genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the issue
of whether Borden, Inc. is the common law employer of Aragon, and
concerning the issue of whether Borden, Inc. paid any of James M.
Aragon's workers's compensation award.

Accordingly, there exists

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden, Inc. is
entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy provisions of
U.C.A. §35-1-60.
Finally, because the trial court, in arriving at its ruling on
summary judgment, ultimately relied upon the exact same factual
2

allegations proffered by Defendant that Plaintiff wished to rebut,
in requesting his Rule 56(f) motion for continuance to conduct
further discovery, it was reversible error on the part of the trial
court to deny Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ARAGON'S INTERPRETATION OF U.C.A. §78-15-3 IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT AND WITH
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
A.
The complete history of U.C.A. S78-15-3 reflects the
Legislature's intent to toll the running of the statute of
limitations period until the injured party has discovered that a
cause of action has accrued..
In the case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 684
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that the old version of
U.C.A. §78-15-3, which set forth a statute of repose in product
liability cases, was unconstitutional.

This ruling was based on

the fact that situations existed in which the statute of repose
barred the filing of a lawsuit, even though the cause of action did
not arise until after it was barredf and even when the injured
person had been diligent in seeking a judicial remedy.

Id..

In

April of 1989, the Utah State Legislature repealed U.C.A. §78-15-2
of the Product Liability Act, which code section originally stated
the purpose of the Act, and also amended U.C.A. §78-15-3, the
statute of limitations provision of the Act.
of U.C.A. §78-15-3 states the following:

3

The amended version

"A civil action under this chapter shall be brought
within two years from the time the individual who would
be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the
exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both
the harm and its cause."
In the case of State v. Amador, 804 P. 2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App.
1990), the Utah Appellate Court stated the following concerning the
amendment of statutory law:
"Every amendment not expressly characterized as a
clarification carries the rebuttable presumption that it
is intended to change existing legal rights and
liabilities."
Accordingly, because the Legislature repealed U.C.A. §78-15-2,
there is a legal presumption that the Legislature, in drafting the
Utah Product Liability Act, changed its intent from that stated in
the original legislation.
Furthermore, because the new statute of limitations provision,
stated in U.C.A. §78-15-3, incorporates the "discovery rule," the
revised statute itself shows a change in the Legislature's intent
concerning the Utah Product Liability Act.
Legislature, in drafting

the

revised

It appears that the

statute

of

limitations

provision of U.C.A. §78-15-3, intended to toll the running of the
statute of limitations period, until an injured party has had a
reasonable opportunity to discover that a cause of action based on
products liability has accrued.
If, in drafting the current Product liability Act statute of
limitations provision, the Legislature intended to toll the running
of the statute of limitations period until the claimant discovered
or should have discovered that his cause of action had accrued, it
is

logical

to

make

the

discovery
4

of

the

identity

of

the

manufacturer of the alleged harmful product a necessary element in
the accrual of a products liability action. As a practical matter,
a claimant in a products liability action cannot effectively pursue
such an action until he has discovered the identity of the manufacturer of the harmful product, which product is an inanimate object.
It goes without saying that it would be absurd to require a
Plaintiff to attempt to extract damages from the offending res—the
product causing the injury. Therefore, Plaintiff's interpretation
of U.C.A. §78-15-3 is consistent with the Utah State Legislature's
intent to toll the running of the statute of limitations period
until the injured party discovers that a cause of action has
accrued.
B.

Aragon's interpretation of U.C.A. S78-15-3 is consistent
with accepted principles of statutory construction.
Aragon is requesting the Court of Appeals to interpret U.C.A.

§78-15-3 to require that the two-year statute of limitations period
for a products liability action be tolled until the claimant has
discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered, both the harm, and its cause.

Additionally, Aragon is

requesting the Court of Appeals to interpret the word "cause" to
include an awareness of the product that caused the claimant's
injury, as well as an awareness of the identity of the maker of
that product.

This interpretation is consistent with accepted

principles of statutory construction.
U.C.A. §68-3-2 states in relevant part:

5

"The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions
and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the
statutes and to promote justice."
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that U.C.A. §68-3-2 directs Utah
appellate courts to construe statutes liberally, with a view to
effect their objects and to promote justice, especially when an
interpretation of a particular statute is a question of first
impression before the appellate courts.

Brickyard Homeowners'

Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1983).

Because

the interpretation of the relevant statute in this case, U.C.A.
§78-15-3, is an issue of first impression before the Utah appellate
courts, the Court of Appeals is required to

construe the statute

liberally, with a view to effect its object and promote justice.
As has been explained above, the object and intent of the subject
statute is to toll the running of the statute of limitations period
on products liability actions, until the claimant has discovered or
should have discovered the facts necessary for the accrual of his
cause of action.
Defendant has argued that the only facts necessary for the
accrual of a products liability action in Utah are (1) that the
Plaintiff has discovered that he has been harmed, and (2) that the
Plaintiff has discovered the product that has caused his harm.
However, Defendant ignores the fact that, until the Plaintiff has
had a reasonable opportunity to discover the identity of the
manufacturer of the product that has caused his harm, he cannot, as
a

practical matter, bring

a cause of action

6

to remedy his

situation,

because he has no one to sue.

Accordingly, an

interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 that requires a Plaintiff to
bring a cause of action before he has had a reasonable opportunity
to discover the identity of the proper Defendant (namely, the
manufacturer of the product that has caused him harm) is unjust.
Moreover, such an interpretation does not accomplish the
object of the statute of limitations provision found in U.C.A. §7815-3.

The whole purpose of legislating the amended version of

U.C.A. §78-15-3 was to provide a person injured by a product with
reasonable opportunity to discover that his cause of action against
a

products

manufacturer

limitations provision

had

accrued, before

expired.

the

statute of

If the identity of the manufac-

turer of the harmful product is not required to be an essential
element in the accrual of a cause of action for products liability,
the actual effect of the new products liability statute of limitations provision is the same as the effect of the old products
liability

statute of repose—it

has the potential

to bar a

claimant's cause of action for products liability before the
claimant is even aware of all facts necessary to properly pursue
such a cause of action.
U.C.A. §68-3-11 states the following:
"Words and phrases are to be construed according to the
context and the approved usage of the language; but
technical words and phrases, and such others as have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or
are defined by statute, are to be construed according to
such peculiar and appropriate definition.
As was stated in Appellant's original Appellate Brief, in the
context of a products liability statute of limitations provision,
7

the word "cause" has been given a definition by the majority of
state jurisdictions to mean "both the product that caused the harm
to the Plaintiff and the identity of the manufacturer of such
product."

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Legislature is

presumed to be aware of special legal definitions or meanings given
to words used in legislation, and is presumed to have attached
those meanings or definitions to such words, in a statute that
becomes law.

See, Greenhalgh v. Pavson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801

(Utah 1975).

Thus, it should be presumed that, at the time the

Legislature created the amended version of U.C.A. §78-15-3, it was
aware of how the courts of other jurisdictions interpreted the word
"cause"

in the context of

statute of

limitations provisions

concerning products liability actions. It should also be presumed
that the Legislature intended the word "cause" to be given the
legal meaning applied to such word by the majority of other state
jurisdictions in that context.

Therefore, it should be presumed

that the Legislature intended U.C.A. §78-15-3 to be given the
interpretation requested by the Plaintiff in the above entitled
matter.
Also, the Utah Supreme Court recently stated the following:
"It is also proper in construing a statute which deals
with tort claims to interpret the statute in accord with
relevant tort law. Finally, in dealing with an unclear
statute, this court renders interpretations that will
best promote the protection of the public."
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991).
Appellant has encouraged the court to interpret U.C.A. §78-15-3 in
accordance with the majority rule of common law set forth in the
8

tort case law of other jurisdictions. It is a correct principle of
statutory construction to do so. By adopting the interpretation of
U.C.A. §78-15-3 requested by Appellant, the Court of Appeals will
best promote the protection of the public. Such an interpretation
will not create the risk that some claimants will have their
products liability claims barred before they have had a reasonable
opportunity to discover all elements necessary to bring a valid
products liability action in a court of law.
Plaintiff's

interpretation

of

U.C.A.

§78-15-3

is

also

consistent with the principle of statutory construction stated in
the case of Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046
(Utah 1978), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
"A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that a
statute is presumed not to be intended to produce absurd
consequences and that where possible it will be given a
reasonable and sensible construction.
This Court
recognizes its duty to render such interpretation of the
laws as will best promote the protection of the public."
Certainly, an interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 that would bar a
plaintiff's cause of action before he had a reasonable opportunity
to discover the identity of the proper defendant would produce
absurd consequences.
Finally, the Respondent argues that the its

restrictive

interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 achieves an appropriate balance
between competing objectives.

Respondent, however, ignores the

fact that the severe hardship placed on a Plaintiff by having his
claim absolutely barred by a restrictive statutory interpretation
far exceeds any potential hardship that might be placed on a
Defendant who may have some difficulty of proof caused by the
9

passage of time. In this case, the Defendant, Casa Herrerra, Inc.,
has produced

no evidence

to

show that passage

of

time has

perceivably prejudiced or imposed any hardship on said Defendant.

POINT II
BY EXPRESSLY INCORPORATING THE "DISCOVERY RULE" INTO
U.C.A. §78-15-3# THE LEGISLATURE HAS MANDATED A COMMON
LAW REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD BE
TOLLED UNTIL A PLAINTIFF DISCOVERS THE IDENTITY OF THE
HARMFUL PRODUCT'S MANUFACTURER.
U.C.A. §78-15-3 expressly incorporates the "discovery rule"
into

the

provision.

Utah

Product

Liability Act

statute

of

limitations

U.C.A. §78-15-3 states the following:

"A civil action under this chapter shall be brought
within two years from the time the individual who would
be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the
exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both
the harm and its cause." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that, when the "discovery rule"
is

specifically

incorporated

into

a

statute

of

limitations

provision, the statute of limitations period does not begin to run
until the facts forming the basis for the cause of action are
discovered [or should have been discovered]. Becton Dickinson and
Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983).
As was explained previously in this Reply Brief, in creating
U.C.A. §78-15-3 the Legislature intended to guard the public
against a perceived risk, namely, that a claimant might have his
products liability claim barred before he has had a reasonable
opportunity to discover all the facts forming the basis for a cause
of action. One necessary element or fact forming the basis for the
10

accrual of a products liability action is the identity of the
manufacturer

of

the

product

that

harmed

the

Plaintiff•

Accordingly, by incorporating the "discovery rule" into U.C.A. §7815-3, the Legislature demonstrated its intent to allow a claimant
a reasonable opportunity to discover all facts necessary to form
the basis for a valid

products

liability cause of action,

including the identity of the manufacturer of the product that
caused the claimant's injury.

POINT III
BECAUSE U.C.A. §78-15-3 IS A MORE SPECIFIC AND MORE
RECENTLY LEGISLATED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION, IT
SHOULD GOVERN THIS LAWSUIT, RATHER THAN THE GENERAL FOURYEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION FOUND IN U.C.A.
S78-12-25(3).
In the case of Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d
214, 216 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
"When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the
more specific provision will govern over the more general
provision. Thus . . . a limitation period for a specific
type of action . . . controls over an older, more general
statute of limitations." (Citations omitted.)
Obviously, U.C.A. §78-15-3 is both a more specific and a more
recent statute of limitations provision than the general four-year
statute of limitations provision found in U.C.A. §78-12-25(3). As
was explained in Appellant's original Appellate Brief, because the
general four-year statute of limitations provision of U.C.A. §7812-25(3) had not yet expired on the effective date of the new
products liability statute of limitations provision, U.C.A. §7815-3 became the governing statute of limitations provision for the
11

above entitled case on its effective date (April 24, 1989). U.C.A.
§12-25(3) would continue to be the applicable statute of limitations provision in the above entitled lawsuit, only if Aragon had
discovered or should have discovered all facts forming the basis
for his products liability cause of action more than two years
prior to the effective date of the amended version of U.C.A. §7815-3.
POINT IV
THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER ARAGON SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED THE IDENTITY OF THE
MANUFACTURER OF THE SUBJECT MASA FEEDER MACHINE PRIOR TO
THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH IDENTITY WAS ACTUALLY DISCOVERED.
The fact that Plaintiff did not discover the identity of Casa
Herrerra, Inc. as the manufacturer of the subject masa feeder
machine until July 13, 1990, is an undisputed fact in this matter.
Nevertheless, Defendant/Respondent contends that the trial court
could have determined, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff/Appellant
should have discovered the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc. more
than two years prior to October 16, 1990 (the date on which Casa
Herrerra, Inc. was joined to the action as a party Defendant).
Plaintiff/ Appellant believes that this court cannot determine
that issue, as a matter of law, for two reasons.

First, in the

trial court hearings, the issue of Aragon's efforts to discover the
identity of the masa feeder machine manufacturer was not an issue
that was actively adjudicated.

The trial court did not have the

full set of facts on this issue in front of it at the time it
granted

Casa

Herrerra,

Inc.'s
12

motion

for

summary

judgment.

Consequently, rather than making an informed decision based on
facts, the trial court arbitrarily made an absolute determination,
as a matter of law, that two years from the date of injury was
ample time for any plaintiff to discover the identity of the
manufacturer of an injurious product. Appellant is unaware of any
law, either statutory or case law, that supports the trial court's
legal conclusion.
Furthermore, the issue of whether

a plaintiff

has used

reasonable diligence to discover all the facts necessary for a
cause of action to accrue under a "discovery rule" statute of
limitations provision is ordinarily an issue for the trier of fact.
See. Jacobv v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital. 662 P.2d

613, 618

(Hawaii App. 1981); McCarroll v. Doctors General Hosp.. 664 P. 2d
382, 385 (Okl. 1983); See also. Yerkes v. Rockwood Clinic. 527 P.2d
689, 692-693 (Wash. App. 1974).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following:
"It has long been established in our law that a court
should not take the case from the jury where there is any
substantial dispute in the evidence on issues of fact,
but can properly do so only when the matter is so plain
that there really is no conflict in the evidence upon
which reasonable minds could differ . . . . [U]nless the
question is free from doubt, the court cannot pass upon
it as a matter of law—if the court is in doubt whether
reasonable men might arrive at different conclusions,
then this very doubt determines the question to be one of
fact for the jury and not one of law for the court."
Flvnn v. W.P. Harlin Construction Co.. 509 P.2d 356, 361 (Utah
1973); See also. Cruz v. Montova. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)
("If the evidence and its inferences would cause reasonable men to
arrive at different conclusions as to whether the essential facts
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were or were not proved, then the question is one of fact for the
jury.11).

The trial court made a supposed legal determination

concerning the issue of whether the Plaintiff had been reasonably
diligent in seeking the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc., even
though the court was provided with only a semblance of evidence
from either party concerning this issue.
Secondly, even based on the evidence in front of the trial
court at the time of its decision, the court could not say, as a
matter of law, that reasonable men could not arrive at different
conclusions concerning whether Aragon was reasonably diligent.
According to the evidence before the court at the time of its
decision, Aragon made an attempt to discover the identity of the
manufacturer of the subject masa feeder machine several months
prior

to

the

running

of

the

original

four-year

statute of

limitations (which statute of limitations initially governed this
case).

In addition, the owner of the masa feeder machine was

extemely uncooperative in providing Aragon with such information.
Therefore, Aragon had to rely on the slow, inefficient process of
judicially

supervised

discovery

in

order

to

extract

such

information from the owner of the machine. Clearly, it is possible
that a reasonable man would determine that Aragon exercised due
diligence

in

attempting

to

discover

the

identity

of

the

manufacturer of the masa feeder machine, based on these facts.
Therefore, the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of
law, that the Appellant/Plaintiff did not exercise due diligence in
attempting to discover the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc.
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POINT V
THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE DICTATE THAT THE COURT SHOULD
LIBERALLY CONSTRUE THE FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF/
APPELLANT TO PROCEED WITH HIS LAWSUIT AGAINST CASA
HERRERRA, INC. ON ITS MERITS.
As was stated in the Statement of Facts in Plaintiff's
original Appellate Brief, Casa Herrerra, Inc. failed to file an
answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Consequently, on January
31, 1991, a Default Certificate and Default Judgment were entered
against it and in favor of James M. Aragon, on the issue of
liability, on Plaintiff's First and Second Claims for Relief
(R.171-173).

Casa Herrerra, Inc. then made a motion to set aside

the Default, and the court granted that motion.

The trial court

entered its Order Setting Aside the Default on April 9, 1991
(R.183-185, 195).

Thereafter, the trial court allowed

Casa

Herrerra, Inc. to file a motion for summary judgment against the
Plaintiff, based on a defense of failure to comply with the
applicable statute of limitations

(R. 443).

That motion for

summary judgment was ultimately granted on November 13, 1991 (R.
523-525, 586-589).
Thus, the trial court decided to set aside Plaintiff's Default
Judgment against Casa Herrerra, Inc., although

Plaintiff was

clearly

Then,

entitled

to

such

Default

Judgment.

without

exhibiting any sense of fairness or equity, the trial court allowed
Casa Herrerra, Inc. to obtain the equivalent of a default judgment
against Plaintiff—by granting its motion for summary judgment
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based on Plaintiff's alleged non-compliance with the statute of
limitations.

The trial court's actions fly in the face of the

fundamental legal principle that one who seeks equity must do
equity.

Therefore, if

it

is necessary

to weigh

equitable

determinations in order for the Appellate Court to render a
decision in this matter, all such equities should be decided in
favor of the Plaintiff/Appellant.

After all, James M. Aragon at

one time actually had a Default Judgment against Casa Herrerra,
Inc. in this case, which Default Judgment was set aside by the
trial court as an equitable measure, presumably, so that the case
could be tried on its merits.
POINT VI
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER BORDEN, INC. PAID ARAGON'S WORKER'S
COMPENSATION AWARD WAS NOT LITIGATED IN THE WORKER'S
COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS, AND LITIGATION OF SUCH ISSUE IS
NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
Respondents, Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc., argue
that because the document filed with the Utah State Industrial
Commission entitled "Compensation Agreement" listed both Clover
Club Foods Company and "Borden" (R. 490) in the heading of such
document as the employer, the issue of who paid James M. Aragon's
worker's

compensation

award

is

res

judicata,

and

cannot

be

litigated in the above entitled lawsuit.
Preliminarily,

it

should

"Compensation Agreement" lists

be

pointed

out

that

such

"Borden" as James M. Aragon's

employer, rather than "Borden, Inc." (R. 490). (It is "Borden,
Inc." who is a party to this lawsuit, rather than "Borden.")
16

Certainly, "Borden" is not the same legal entity as "Borden, Inc."
The doctrine of res judicata is stated as follows:
"[A] claim once litigated cannot be relitigated in a
subsequent case between the same parties or their
privies."
Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048
(Utah 1983).

"Borden, Inc." was never a party to the Industrial

Commission proceedings, although for some unexplained reason an
entity by the name of "Borden" was listed as a party (R.487-490).
Accordingly, all of Respondents' sophisticated arguments concerning
res judicata are not applicable in this case.
In addition, the doctrine of res judicata bars only the
relitigation of claims that have once been adjudicated, or the
litigation of claims that should have been adjudicated in the
initial proceeding but were not.

Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch

Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d at 1048.

In this case, Aragon's obvious

common

law employer, Clover Club Foods Company, had primary

responsibility to pay Aragon's worker's compensation claim and was
covered by worker's compensation insurance. Thus, there was never
any need to adjudicate the issue of whether Borden, Inc. was also
secondarily liable for Aragon's worker's compensation claim as
Aragon's statutory employer. Furthermore, there is no evidence in
the record to indicate that the issue of whether Borden, Inc. was
Aragon's statutory employer was ever litigated. Moreover, there is
no evidence in the record to indicate that it was ever necessary to
litigate this issue.

Accordingly, because this issue was neither

an issue that was adjudicated nor an issue that should have been
17

adjudicated

in

the

Industrial

Commission

proceedings,

the

litigation of such issue is not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
Finally, even if for the sake of argument this Court assumes
that "Borden, Inc." was listed as a party on the "Compensation
Agreement" (as a party who was jointly and severally liable to
Aragon for his worker's compensation award), that fact alone does
not establish that it was Borden, Inc. who actually paid such
award.

The only evidence in the record to indicate that Borden,

Inc. may have actually paid any of James M. Aragon's worker's
compensation award is the Affidavit of Rex J. Ballinger, which
indicates the following:
"Pursuant to the terms of the policy, Liberty Mutual on
behalf of Borden and Clover Club paid James Aragon
$17,537.40." (R.273).
Mr. Ballinger does not indicate whether only one dollar of such
amount was paid on behalf of Borden, Inc. and whether $17,536.40
was paid on behalf of Clover Club Foods Company, or just what
proportion of the money, if any, was paid by each party.

At the

very least, there is a factual issue in this case concerning the
percentage of the worker's compensation award of James M. Aragon
that was actually paid by Clover Club Foods Company, and the
percentage of such worker's compensation award that was actually
paid by Borden, Inc.

If Borden, Inc. actually paid only a de

minimis amount of such worker's compensation award, there would be
no reason to give Borden, Inc. the benefit of the protection of the
exclusive remedy provisions of U.C.A. §35-1-60.
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Therefore, such

issue is a material issue of fact, and precludes the granting of a
summary judgment in this matter•
The issue of whether Borden, Inc. actually paid any of the
worker's compensation award assessed against Clover Club Foods
Company (and possibly against Borden, Inc.) and in favor of Aragon
was never adjudicated in the Industrial Commission proceeding, or
otherwise.

Based on the foregoing, because the issue of whether

Borden, Inc. paid any of Aragon's worker's compensation award has
never been litigated, it cannot be barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
POINT VII
THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER BORDEN, INC. IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. §35-1-60.
As was stated in Respondent's brief, Appellant is not contesting the fact that Clover Club Foods Company is a common law
employer of Appellant, who paid the worker's compensation award of
Appellant, and who is, therefore, entitled to the protection of the
exclusive remedy provisions of U.C.A. §35-1-60.

Accordingly,

Appellant does not oppose the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in this matter concerning Clover Club Foods Company.
However, as was stated in Appellant's original Appellate Brief,
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden,
Inc. is also a common law employer of Appellant, who also paid the
worker's

compensation

award

of Appellant, and

who

is also,

therefore, entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy
provisions of U.C.A. §35-1-60.
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Respondents are mistaken in asserting that the issue of
whether Borden, Inc. was James M. Aragon's common law employer was
litigated in the Industrial Commission proceedings. The fact that
the name "Borden" appears in the heading of the pleading entitled
"Compensation Agreement" does not magically bar Appellant from
litigating the issue of whether Borden, Inc. is Appellant's common
law employer.

Even if "Borden, Inc." (rather than "Borden") was

listed as an employer of Aragon on the "Compensation Agreement," no
distinction was made in such "Compensation Agreement" concerning
whether "Borden" was Aragon's common law employer or Aragon's
statutory employer.

Furthermore, as was set forth previously in

this Reply Brief, the issue of whether Borden, Inc. actually paid
Aragon's worker's compensation award has never been litigated.
Thus, such issue is not barred from litigation by the doctrine of
res judicata.

Finally, a genuine issue of material fact exists

concerning the extent of which, if any, Borden, Inc. paid Aragon's
worker's compensation award.
A genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden, Inc.
was James M. Aragon's common law employer is created by the
following facts:
1.

There is no evidence in the record to indicate that

Borden, Inc. exercised control over the every day work activities
of James M. Aragon, other than in some indirect capacity as the
100% stockholder of Clover Club Foods Company.
2.

At the time James M. Aragon applied for his job at Clover

Club Foods Company, his employment application was submitted on a
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Clover Club Foods Company form (R. 342, 343).

When Aragon was

terminated by Clover Club Foods Company, the termination document
stated that Aragon was terminating employment with Clover Club
Foods Company, with no mention of Borden, Inc. (R.345).

In

addition, when Aragon applied for a job and went to work for Clover
Club Foods Company, he believed that he was working for Clover Club
Foods Company, not Borden, Inc. (R.287, 288).
A genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden, Inc.
actually paid any portion of Aragon's worker's compensation claim
is created by the following facts:
1.

The Industrial Commission document entitled "Compensation

Agreement" does not list "Borden, Inc." as the employer of Aragon,
but only lists "Borden" (R. 490).

Normally, an entity named

"Borden" would not be the legal equivalent of an entity named
"Borden, Inc." when listed as a party to a pleading.
2.

Even if the court were to assume that the so-called

"Compensation Agreement" assessed

joint and several liability

against both Clover Club Foods Company and "Borden, Inc.," there is
no indication on such pleading as to who actually paid such
worker's compensation award.
3.

Even though Rex J. Ballinger states in his Affidavit (R.

273) that Liberty Mutual paid James Aragon $17,537.40 on behalf of
"Borden and Clover Club," there is no indication as to what portion
of such $17,537.40 paid by Liberty Mutual to Aragon was paid on
behalf of "Borden, Inc." and what portion was paid on behalf of
Clover Club Foods Company.

Certainly, if only one dollar (or some
21

other de minimis amount) was paid on behalf of Borden, Inc., it
would be inequitable to determine as a matter of law that Borden,
Inc. was entitled to immunity under the provisions of U.C.A. §35-160, because it had paid Aragon's workers compensation award.

POINT VIII
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
DENY PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION.
Respondent contends that Aragon filed two strikingly similar
Rule 56(f) motions in this case. An examination of those motions
show that this contention is a misrepresentation.

Plaintiff's

first Rule 56(f) motion sought a continuance to obtain Defendants'
answers to the discovery requests that had already been served on
Defendants, so that Plaintiff could answer Defendants' U.R.C.P.
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (R. 134,135).

Plaintiff's second

Rule 56(f) motion sought to depose Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E.
Barkley, so that Plaintiff could rebut the statements made in the
affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. Barkley (R. 290-297,
445-456).
At the time Plaintiff filed his second Rule 56(f) motion, he
had already expended significant efforts in an attempt to discover
relevant corporate information from the Defendants. However, many
of Defendants' answers to Plaintiff's discovery requests were nonresponsive.

Therefore, at the time Plaintiff was required to

respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment (and to the
affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. Barkley), the only
effective way

for Plaintiff

to explore
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the veracity of the

affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. Barkley was to depose
them.

The affidavit testimony of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E.

Barkley was critical information in relation to Defendants' motion
for summary judgment.

This affidavit testimony was relied upon

heavily by the trial court in arriving at its decision to grant
summary judgment.

Without deposing Rex Ballinger and Raymond E.

Barkley, Plaintiff had no way to either verify or contradict the
information contained in their affidavits.

Defendants refused to

make Mr. Barkley and Mr. Ballinger available for depositions until
the court had made a ruling on Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion.
Ultimately, even though it was obvious that Plaintiff would be
unable to present facts essential to justify his opposition to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, unless he was granted a
continuance in order to depose Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E.
Barkley, the court failed to grant Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion.
Then, the trial court relied upon the very information Plaintiff
desired to rebut (the affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E.
Barkley) as the primary basis for its ruling on Defendant's motion
for summary judgment. This is the very type of unfair, inequitable
treatment that constitutes arbitrary and capricious behavior on the
part of a trial court. Clearly, such action constitutes reversible
error in the exercise of the trial court's judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's order of summary
judgment concerning both Casa Herrerra, Inc. and Borden, Inc.
should be reversed, and this case should be remanded to the trial
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court to be tried on its merits. Accordingly, Plaintiff/Appellant
James M. Aragon respectfully requests the court to reverse the
order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendant Casa Herrerra, Inc. and Borden, Inc.
DATED this

\2J^

day of June, 1992.
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES

DOUGLAS MZ^DURBANO
PAUL H. JOHNSON
Attorney*for Plaintiff/Appellant
James M. Aragon
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APPENDIX A
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Douglas M. Durbano (#4209)
Paul H. Johnson (#4856)
Attorneys for
4185 Harrison Boulevard, #320
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 621-4111

QsUVSl

CLEK:;. *.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

JAMES M. ARAGON,
DEFAULT

Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE

vs.
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA,
INC., a California Corporation,
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive,

Civil No. 900747717PI
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
It
entitled

appearing
cause

from

that

the

the

file

and

Defendant,

records
Casa

in

the above-

Herrerra,

Inc., a

California corporation, has been duly and properly served with
Summons and Complaint, and said Defendant having failed to answer
or otherwise plead to said Summons within the period of time
permitted therefore by law,
THE DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE PREMISES IS HEREWITH
ENTERED.
WITNESS:

My hand and seal this

%]

-f-

day of ^MJUjMlL^f 1991.

j

0

CLERK OF THE COURT
(2\pldgs\85070.dec)

By.
K/<Y>>
Deputy Clerk

Nfli-fr

f\V«$*

APPENDIX B

Douglas M. Durbano (#4209)
Paul H. Johnson (#4856)
Attorneys for
4185 Harrison Boulevard, #320
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 621-4111

CL1
3V.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

JAMES M. ARAGON,
:

Plaintiff,

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New
:
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA,
INC., a California Corporation,
:
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive,
•

Civil No. 900747717PI
Judge Doulas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
:

It appearing from the file and records in the aboveentitled

cause

that

the

Defendant, Casa

Herrerra, Inc., a

California corporation, has been duly and properly served with
Summons and Complaint, and said Defendant having failed to answer
or otherwise plead to said Summons within the period of time
permitted therefore by law, and the Clerk of the Court having
heretofore

entered

the Default of the

said

Defendant

in the

premises, and it appearing to the Court that the Plaintiff is
entitled to Judgment in accordance with the pleadings, it is now
by the Court Ordered that:
JUDGMENT

IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE

DEFENDANT, CASA HERRERRA, INC., IS GRANTED AS FOLLOWS:

ftt#»
Mmm

ENTERED

1.

Judgment

is

entered

against

the

Defendant,

Casa

Herrerra, Inc., on the issue of liability on Plaintiff's First and
Second Claims for Relief.
2.
Plaintiff

Defendant,

Casa

Herrera,

Inc.,

is

liable

to

the

for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as set forth in

Plaintiff's Complaint, in an amount to be established pursuant to
evidentiary hearing, which will be scheduled by the court.
3.

For costs of court in a sum to be established by

Affidavit of the Plaintiff.

annum

on

4.

Interest at the rate of twelve percent

the

judgment

amount,

from

the

time

of

the

(12%) per
entry

of

judgment until paid in full.

DATED AND ENTERED this

3/

day of

c7Z„^*^y

1991 •

^ ^

DOUGLAS-!/. CORNABY
District Court Judge

(2\pldgs\850570.dej)

DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Argon v. Clover Club et al.

-2-

APPENDIX C

FILED IN C L M V '~ f»i FICE

f:rR 10 12:5 i',1'Si
Jay E. Jensen, #1676
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Casa Herrera
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 355-3431

OL:HK, r *.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES M. ARA60N,
ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v,
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, BORDEN, INC.,
a New Jersey corporation,
CASA HERRERA, INC., a California
corporation, and JOHN DOES
I through X, inclusive,

Civil No. 900747717 PI
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
The motion of the defendant Casa Herrera to set aside
default and default judgment was heard during the pre-trial on
Monday, April 8, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby in the above-entiteld Court.
as follows:

The parties were represented

Paul H. Johnson for plaintiff, Allan T. Brinkerhoff

for the defendants Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc., and
Jay E. Jensen for defendant Casa Herrera, Inc.

The Court having

considered the affidavits accompnying the motion and based upon
the records herein, and good cause apearing,
The

motion

of

defendant

Casa

Herrera

for

an

order

setting aside the default and default judgment is hereby granted
and said default and default judgment are hereby set aside.

FILMED

001097ft

^.utt twiBEU

The

defendant Casa Herrera, Inc. is ordered to respond to the amended
complaint dated August 14, 1990 by April 13, 1991.
DATED the

9

day of April, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

S^^f,,,/'/

Dougwrs' L. Cornaby
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

day of April, 1991,

a true and correct copy of ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Paul H. Johnson
Douglas M. Durbano
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200
Ogden, UT 84403
Allan T. Brinkerhoff
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

APPENDIX D

*PJO
Applicant)

. *
•
a

.
„
. *• - . .
• • • . . _ •

^/f^Ctf
'

%
Clover Club v^A.
r.« I *„A—
(Employer)

and »
*

- U t e r t v Mutual Tnniirflnre Hn
(Insurance Carrier) (C667-2A386 R)

COMPENSATION
/.CKEtMENl

*

Defendants.

* . . y() ft J

*

•87-

WHEREAS,
Jampn Ar«pn
sustained a personal injury by
accident arising out of or in the course of employment on the 16th dav of December
,
l ^ i l while employed by Clnvpr Hlnh Fnnrfg Co,/ iomitn
* * h l c h •eeldent has
been duly reported to the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah.
According to the
physician's reports and agreement between the parties hereto, said Applicant sustained, as
a result of said accident, temporary total disability and/or permanent partial disability,
as well as incurring medical and/or hospital expenses, as hereinafter set forth:
1.

Temporary total disability from
12/p/i^
to
5/5/R7
payable at the rate of I 128.00 Per week for a total of t 5390,39
has. been incurred and the carrier/employer has paid a total of I §39939
of which the following amount was taxed: i
n
**.

j
•
»

2. "Permanent partial disability based on 7ft
weeks payable at the rate of
t 128-00
per week beginning 6/15/87
for a total of SovS/, ,QQ
n M Deen
• n d * 513.00
•dvanced thereunto, of which * _ Q
was taxed**.
Said permanent partial disability consists of the specific loss as follows:
25% whole man
3.

Recapitulation of compensation benefits paid in connection with this claim:
(a) Medical—Hospital and Miscellaneous incurred $
Paid to date 1 4*i ,n<;7 I A
Balance (if toy) due
(b) Total Weekly Compensation Benefits due
t_
* In,, ? 7 A 9 9
Paid to date $>_JL .A02,29
Balance (if any) due
I 9472.00
(c) Total Medical ar.i Compensation due per this Compensation
Agreement:
t 9472.00

Pursuant to UCA 35-1-69, the Second Injury Fund will reimburse the carrier/employer,
H/A
X of all temporary total disability compensation and
medical expenses paid on this claim and will pay the applicant
weeks of compensation at the rate of $
for an impairment of
for a total of t
.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of the amounts stated in Section 3
above — as provided by law — the Applicant hereby accepts the compensation and Medical
payments paid to date and agrees with the permanent partial disability rating shown above.
However, the Industrial Commission of Utah shall retain continuing jurisdiction to modify
awards at provided by law. Medical expenses incurred as a result of the industrial accident are the continuing obligation of tbe insurance carrier or employer.
It is understood that this agreement becomes binding and effective only when it is
approved by the Industrial Commission.
^

525-21-im

fiht*fi/J'

Employee's Social Security Number

/&.

/ s/^^^7

-Signature of Applicant.

—4JfULl(f$whMu*

7

Jam&fAragon

(iCf/j

Signature ot Insurance Carrier/Employerrrary Birdson,
li/A

Signature of Second Injury fund Administrator
The above Compensation has been reviewed and Is approved by the Industrial Commission
of Utah. Attorney's fees of I 1420. 80 should be deducted from the Amounts owing and paid
by the carrier/employer to Douglas Mf Durbflnn^jjfift; Ppf e y f f i h o ^ S * / g 4 0 . 8 0 . TCA
Approved this

I**r1
NOTr:

f

I

^

MU\\mT£*tfCLV.V

J. 1CE

COMPENSATION IS TAX EXEMPT PER SECTION 6334 (A) (*/OF SECTION 26, U S. CODE.

Original will be returned to carrier/employer and signed copy to employee.
enclosures of Forms 122, 123, 1*1, and documents showing rating(s) by doetor(s).

Remember

